@Scout
My understanding of Rooster's point is that we have to maintain as strong a defense as possible otherwise we lose ground and lives to an aggressor too quickly. You support that by giving numerous examples of the US's unique cold war approach of maintaining a huge standing army failing to achieve precisely that goal. So that we still have to resort to the WW2 and pre-WW2 behavior of retreating defense (trading lives for time) until additional nation support is organized.
So it seems lives are condemned to death whether we sped the money or not. Money, which we do not have.
You may be
reading Scout, but you are not
understanding Scout.
There was no huge standing Cold War military when the Norks invaded SK. Demobilization after WWII was quick and profound, from 12mil to 1.5mil. Top that off with the sorry state of training and readiness of the troops available to get to Korea in time to do anything. Those troops were the American occupation troops in Japan. They were in terrible shape from being essentially garrison troops / MPs. Physically, training-wise, and equipment-wise; they just plain were in no way ready to fight when the balloon went up. But we sent them because they were what we had. And many, many of them died.
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0004598.html
Active Duty Military Personnel, 1940–20111
Year Army Air Force Navy Marine Corps Total
1940 269,023 160,997 28,345 458,365
1945 8,266,373 3,319,586 469,925 12,055,884
1950 593,167 411,277 380,739 74,279 1,459,462
1955 1,109,296 959,946 660,695 205,170 2,935,107
1960 873,078 814,752 616,987 170,621 2,475,438
1965 969,066 824,662 669,985 190,213 2,653,926
1970 1,322,548 791,349 691,126 259,737 3,064,760
1975 784,333 612,751 535,085 195,951 2,128,120
1980 777,036 557,969 527,153 188,469 2,050,627
1985 780,787 601,515 570,705 198,025 2,151,032
1990 732,403 535,233 579,417 196,652 2,043,705
1991 710,821 510,432 570,262 194,040 1,985,555
1992 610,450 470,315 541,886 184,529 1,807,177
1993 572,423 444,351 509,950 178,379 1,705,103
1994 541,343 426,327 468,662 174,158 1,610,490
1995 508,559 400,409 434,617 174,639 1,518,224
1996 491,103 389,001 416,735 174,883 1,471,722
1997 491,707 377,385 395,564 173,906 1,438,562
1998 483,880 367,470 382,338 173,142 1,406,830
1999 479,426 360,590 373,046 172,641 1,385,703
2000 482,170 355,654 373,193 173,321 1,384,338
2001 480,801 353,571 377,810 172,934 1,385,116
2002 486,542 368,251 385,051 173,733 1,413,577
2003 490,174 376,402 379,742 177,030 1,423,348
2004 494,112 369,523 370,445 177,207 1,411,287
2005 488,944 351,666 358,700 178,704 1,378,014
2006 (June) 496,362 352,620 353,496 178,923 1,381,401
2007 (Aug.) 519,471 337,312 338,671 184,574 1,380,082
2011 (Sept.) 565,463 333,370 325,123 201,157 1,468,364
Read more: Active Duty Military Personnel, 1940–2011 | Infoplease.com http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0004598.html#ixzz2muTXpKtp
The Norks invaded S Korea in June of 1950, at the nadir of our post-WWII readiness.
Between JUN1950 & JUL1951, 13 months:
1. Norks pushed SK, USA, & others back from pre-war border ~38th parallel into the Pusan perimeter.
2. USA & UN forces fought way back up the peninsula almost to China. Includes Landing at Inchon.
3. China entered the war, pushing us back to roughly the 38th parallel.
After that bloody battles still occurred until JULY1953, but little territory was lost or won.
It was the experience in Korea that spurred America to craft the Cold War military.(1) By 1955, we had doubled the size of the military, increased training/readiness, and stuffed many equipment contracts into the hopper.
Oh, BTW, those troops China used in Korea? They were originally slated to invade Taiwan. We had enough of a Navy to stop that, but could not stop and did not believe the rumors that China would intervene in Korea. And we did not have enough of a force in Korea, numbers or readiness-wise, to keep the Norks or Chinese form thinking they could take us.
(1) Few troops, old/obsolete/insufficient equipment, poor training/readiness)
These days, China is on the ascendance. They constantly push, prod, and probe, testing our and our allies' readiness and resolution. THAT is why the Filipinos want us back, not because they have a newfound love of Uncle Sam. They have first-hand experience with asiatic hegemons and seek a means to contain China. Vietnam is making nice noises toward us, even. Japan is having serious internal debates as to expanding thei military and increasing its power projection capabilities.
Heck, just the other day, China declared a great chunk of international airspace for their own and asserted their authority to dictate what goes on in it. We then sent some (~50 year old) B-52s directly across it to show them what we thought of that. If our capacity or resolve falters, China will act. They will back it up with a nuclear threat, and we will then not dispute the fait accompli. We didnt use nukes in the Korean War, when we had a POTUS with some real stones. We will not use them if China steals a march on us. All one has to do is read China's history to see what is coming.
The "So what" question is this: "So what if China becomes the East Asian hegemon? Why should we care?"
I can think of several reasons:
1. Allies would drift into China's sphere of influence and no longer be
our allies.
2. Economic stranglehold on East Asia. China could dictate terms regarding not just its own production, but all of East Asia's (given that Japan, Taiwan, SK, PI & such are resource-poor manufacturies that rely on the import of raw materials and export of finished goods).
3. Many of our military components are sourced from E Asian allies. We may no longer have access to them or we would face greater risk of their corruption.
4. Loss of basing in E Asia for our military would make any action in the future more difficult.
5. Others around the world would see our interests as vulnerable, given how we succumbed to Chinese pressure, and judge us to be fickle/weak allies.
#2 has obvious profound economic consequences. Probably in magnitude as great or greater than the cost to field a military to prevent it alone.