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Main Forums => The Roundtable => Topic started by: Guest on August 27, 2005, 01:24:31 PM

Title: On Neocon-ism as a system of foreign policy
Post by: Guest on August 27, 2005, 01:24:31 PM
I'm getting sick of the people wanting us to invade various third world mudholes 'just because we are capable of it'. It's even more annoying than the people saying we should just nuke the entire mudhole itself, take Iran for example.

We've been intervening in the affairs of Central and South America since 1853, and look at the results - could not an argument be made that the number of communist countries would be the same or lower if it weren't for our involvement (and not to keep beating this dead horse, but) especially when events like the Bay of Pigs are brought up?

How about Iran-Contra? And the geographically essential Chile's '73 coup? How does that affect my life?

Then Panama: First the canal - Then the mere threat of communism, and then Noriega. Now China swoops in and owns the bastage. Yippee!

Am I supposed to believe that our Government, (who can barely run this freaking country), magically becomes "Super Government" when they dabble outside our borders? No - I'm not going to do that.

Quote
"I spent 33 years in the Marines. Most of my time being a high-classed muscle man for Big business, for Wall Street and the bankers. In short, I was a racketeer for capitalism. I helped purify Nicaragua for the international banking house of Brown Brothers in 1909-1912. I helped make Mexico and especially Tampico safe for American oil interests in 1914. I brought light to the Dominican Republic for American sugar interests in 1916. I helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the National City Bank boys to collect revenue in. I helped in the rape of half a dozen Central American republics for the benefit of Wall Street...."

- Smedley D. Butler (1881-1940) Major General (U.S. Marine Corps)
I suppose my main problem with standing armies filled with professional career soldiers is that they are not nearly the same thing as citizen soldiers called up to defend their homeland when necessary.

The neocons were the only ones with a plausible plan in the wake of 9/11. Nobody, left or right, has come up with a credible alternative. In politics something beats nothing, so they won by default. I supported our spanking of Afghanistan. I grudgingly aknowledge that we might as well 'stay the course' in Iraq, after the dozen-odd shifting reasons for being there.

But Sudan? Iran? No. Enough. We should not have to be the world's cop. Half the people crying for us to go invade countries and occupy them are the ones who threw fits over Clinton going on military jaunts to Bosnia and Kosovo, because of course we aren't the global police when a president we dislike is in office.

What's the point of losing soldier's lives to take over a country, knowing that in the end all the other reasons will be lost besides the ubiquitous "bringing democracy and freedom", when actually the population of the country we are entering wasn't capable of doing it for themselves and won't do much with what they're being gifted with in the first place- or when we'll just create another islamic state?

Soldiers shouldn't have to die for some backward third worlder's country or freedom.

Our current world of terrorism is Carter's foreign policy legacy. We made Saddam. We made Bin Laden.

Who are we making today who will haunt us decades in the future?

But some people are addicted to war, and they will never cease to support anything, no questions asked, as long as there's some Hooah and some flag waving. Maybe we'll even end up with a one world government of colonies and protectorates of the US someday. That'll make things fun for the Statist Super-Patriots, they'll only be able to say 'Earth: love it or leave it.'
Title: On Neocon-ism as a system of foreign policy
Post by: The Rabbi on August 27, 2005, 04:29:44 PM
First, I'd like you to define "neo-con."

Second, you basically contradicted yourself in the second paragraph.

Third, esli bui mui vsyo dumaet tak, mui vsyo budyem govorit' po-russkie sevonya.
Title: On Neocon-ism as a system of foreign policy
Post by: Gewehr98 on August 27, 2005, 06:40:24 PM
Yeah, I've been wondering about that term, myself.

"Neo-con".

See it used often at democraticunderground.com and that paragon of all things leftist, DailyKos.com.  I'm supposed to be a neo-con, from what I gather.  Hmmph.  I saw The Matrix, and there was this guy named Neo...
Title: On Neocon-ism as a system of foreign policy
Post by: Perd Hapley on August 27, 2005, 06:48:38 PM
Blackburn, you can disagree with current or past foreign policy all you want, and beat up on the neo-cons, but dealing with terrorist-friendly states (such as Iran, Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia) is absolutely consistent with the government's number one responsibility - killing those who would kill us.  Unfortunately, we can't just topple a man like Saddam and leave.  We have to establish a regime that we can work with to eliminate terrorism.  I don't know whether Bush is doing that the best way or not, but you're way off base.  

We created Saddam and bin Laden?  Get real.  Saddam murdered his way to the top, and later we gave him some weapons, so he could fight a war with a bigger enemy of ours, Iran.  Bin Laden was only one of many mujahadeen who were fighting the Soviets, also a bigger enemy to us at the time.  If I am incorrect about this, please educate me.  I'm not claiming to have the last word.

Can you vouch for the validity of this quotation you posted?  Just because it has a name beneath it doesn't make it real.  That, and it sounds too much like the history course I took with a Berkeley-educated professor.


Rabbi.  Translation.  Now.
Title: On Neocon-ism as a system of foreign policy
Post by: Standing Wolf on August 27, 2005, 06:51:10 PM
Quote
We should not have to be the world's cop.
No, we certainly shouldn't. Unfortunately, we're involved in a world war that we didn't want, didn't look for, didn't cause, and apparently don't even realize we're in.

Fighting land battles in Asia isn't the way to win it.
Title: On Neocon-ism as a system of foreign policy
Post by: Monkeyleg on August 27, 2005, 07:45:16 PM
Short history lesson:

US colonies used for financial advantage by the Crown; complaints filed; complaints ignored; war started; war ended.

UK again attempts to overthrow the now-legitimate US government in the War of 1812. UK troops sent running. New doctrine: the US will purchase as much land on the continent to prevent ever again foreign troops amassing on our soil.

Lincoln declares the war against the Confederacy. Call it whatever name you like, but it was a doctrine designed to keep the US together as a whole. See War of 1812 above.

FDR (to give him at least some credit) recognizes the threat to the US posed by fascist regimes in Europe; works with the UK on a nod-and-a-wink basis, gets our troops over into Germany, and eliminates any threat from that country.

FDR also recognizes the threat of US interests in the Far East posed by Japan. War started, war ends.

Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Nixon and even Carter recognize the threat to US interests posed by the Soviet Union. Billions of dollars in weapons systems developed: ICBM's, theater nukes, tactical nukes. Soviet Union tries to call Reagan's hand on Star Wars. Soviet Union collapses.

With the UK now our friend, and threats from Eastern and Western Europe now gone, as well as the Far East, we face our most immediate threat: terrorists from various Middle East nations. The Middle East is now what the Far East, the Fascists, and the Soviets were years back.

Two choices: wait for them to bring the fight to us, or bring the fight to them.

It ain't that complicated.
Title: On Neocon-ism as a system of foreign policy
Post by: Parker Dean on August 27, 2005, 10:37:46 PM
Quote from: fistful
Can you vouch for the validity of this quotation you posted?  Just because it has a name beneath it doesn't make it real.  That, and it sounds too much like the history course I took with a Berkeley-educated professor.
This quote is probably where the Professor got it since the quote goes back to 1935 and was in some socialist newspaper. It is interesting to note that this Smedley guy was court-martialed a few years before for apparently slandering a foreign leader, and had a failed attempt at getting elected in 1932. Wonder if that had anything to do with how he viewed the U.S.?

Quote
In 1927, Butler served a tour in China and returned to the United States in 1929 as a Major General. In 1931 he publicly recounted a story about Benito Mussolini in which Mussolini struck a child with his automobile and refused to stop. This story caused international outrage, and Butler was arrested and court-martialed at the insistance of Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson. Butler was ordered to apologize to Mussolini, since the relations between Italy and the United States were friendly at the time. Butler refused, deciding instead to retire on October 1, 1931. In 1932, he ran unsuccessfully for the U.S. Senate.
Article: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Smedley_Butler
Title: On Neocon-ism as a system of foreign policy
Post by: Winston Smith on August 27, 2005, 11:02:32 PM
Quote
Third, esli bui mui vsyo dumaet tak, mui vsyo budyem govorit' po-russkie sevonya.
If we all will think so, we all will speak in russian tomorrow.

tomorrow (monday) I will take part in the first AP Russian Class in the history of the united states.
'

But I probably got that wrong, if not in the words, then the tone/implication.
Title: On Neocon-ism as a system of foreign policy
Post by: The Rabbi on August 28, 2005, 06:01:28 AM
The quote says, if we all thought like that we'd be speaking Russian now.
Waiting until the battle is on your front door is way too late.  I would have thought 9/11 and the events leading up to that would have made that painfully obvious.

For Smedley Butler, there is a recent book about America's small wars and Butler fought in most of them.  He was a Quaker and later in life went back to that philosophy and spent his last years dishing out the kind of pablum quoted above.
Title: On Neocon-ism as a system of foreign policy
Post by: Guest on August 28, 2005, 07:06:36 AM
Quote from: Monkeyleg
...Two choices: wait for them to bring the fight to us, or bring the fight to them.

It ain't that complicated.
Two choices in personal self-defense:

 1) When someone attacks you, you defend yourself.

 2) Punch everyone you meet.
Title: On Neocon-ism as a system of foreign policy
Post by: roo_ster on August 28, 2005, 09:55:29 AM
Blackburn:

All those little savage wars of peacetime are the rule, not the exception.  Hey, why doesn't somebody write a book about them...?  Well, one of your despised "neo-cons" did:
The Savage Wars of Peaceby Max Boot.  It gives a good account of all those little wars that generally don't rate being called "War of ..." or "The ...War."

Just looking in the TOC:
Year   ;   Location   ;   Popular Name (NOT all-inclusive)
1801-1805   ;   N Africa   ;   Barbary Wars
1815   ;   N Africa   ;   Barbary Wars
1859   ;   Marquesas   ;   
1859   ;   China   ;   Butcher and Bolt
1871   ;   Korea   ;   
1899   ;   Samoa   ;   
1900   ;   China   ;   Boxer Uprising
1899-1902   ;   Philippines   ;   
1898-1914   ;   Cuba   ;   
1898-1914   ;   Panama   ;   
1898-1914   ;   Nicaragua   ;   
1898-1914   ;   Mexico   ;   
1915-1934   ;   Haiti   ;   
1916-1924   ;   Dominican Republic   ;   
1916-1917   ;   Mexico   ;   Pancho Villa
1918-1920   ;   Russia   ;   Russian Civil War/Revolution/Bloodletting
1926-1933   ;   Nicaragua   ;   Sandino
1901-1941   ;   China   ;   
1959-1975   ;   Vietnam   ;   Vietnam War
1982-?Huh?   ;   Egypt/Israel   ;   Camp David Peace Accord
1987-1988   ;   Persian Gulf   ;   Tanker War
1989   ;   Panama   ;   
1991   ;   Iraq   ;   Gulf War I
1990   ;   Liberia   ;   
1992   ;   Somalia   ;   
1992   ;   Liberia   ;   
1995-?Huh?   ;   Bosnia   ;   
1996   ;   Central African Republic   ;   
1996   ;   Liberia   ;   
1997   ;   Congo   ;   
1997   ;   Sierra Leone   ;   
1999-?Huh?   ;   Kosovo   ;   
2001   ;   Afganistan   ;   


WWI & WWII were the exceptions.

You might note, from looking at the list above of little wars, that the majority of the countries are one we had little economic interest at the time.  

If you read Boot's book, you'll read an awful lot about Smedley Butler.

Quote from: Blackburn
Am I supposed to believe that our Government, (who can barely run this freaking country), magically becomes "Super Government" when they dabble outside our borders? No - I'm not going to do that.
No, such faith is not necesary.  You just have to have faith that the United States Marine Corps and 75th Ranger Regiment are more squared away than Craptasticastan.

Quote from: Blackburn
Half the people crying for us to go invade countries and occupy them are the ones who threw fits over Clinton going on military jaunts to Bosnia and Kosovo,
Rhetorical Question Time:
Do Bosnia and Kosovo produce one of the most important products on the face of the earth?  If Bosnia & Kosovo went completely Tango Uniform and no longer exported anything beyond their borders, would we even notice?  How many jihadis from Bosnia & Kosovo have blown the crap out of us or other civilised countries?  Are we worried Bosnia & Kosovo might get nukes & use them to send thousands of Americans to ther deaths?

Quote from: "Blackburn"
Soldiers shouldn't have to die for some backward third worlder's country or freedom.
Brining freedom in Knucleheadistan is merely a by-product of our intervention.  First and foremost, interventions should be in our interest as we define it.  If the locals stop evicerating each other & hacking off their womens' genitalia, and instead start treating each other better, hooray for humanity!  If not, at least we have drained the fever swamp for a time.

Quote from: "Blackburn"
We made Saddam. We made Bin Laden.
Bravo Sierra.  They are adept enough to produce their own sadists, dictators and fanatics.  Such a view does not reflect reality and limits the role of the mass of humanity outside our borders to being mere re-actors and not actors.  Yep, they're just a mass of jelly that does nothing until we poke them, and then they ripple about, reacting to our stimuli.

Get used to these little expeditions.  They are the rule.  Even Thomas Jefferson found it necessary to send our troops to fight these nasty little wars.
Title: On Neocon-ism as a system of foreign policy
Post by: Perd Hapley on August 28, 2005, 07:46:19 PM
I know I shouldn't give him the satisfaction, but...


Quote
Two choices in personal self-defense:

1) When someone attacks you, you defend yourself.

2) Punch everyone you meet.
Two choices in personal or national defense:

1) When someone earnestly threatens to attack you, you defend yourself by the use of force.

2) You shoot only if he shoots you first.
Title: On Neocon-ism as a system of foreign policy
Post by: Perd Hapley on August 28, 2005, 07:49:35 PM
Quote
I have no idea on the validity of that quote. I don't even agree with the premise of it, but it fit well.
Typical.  Maybe you shouldn't have used it; especially because it doesn't fit very well.  Unless you can tell us about that turn-of the century 9-11 carried out by Latin America.
Title: On Neocon-ism as a system of foreign policy
Post by: mfree on August 29, 2005, 05:54:10 AM
"Unless you can tell us about that turn-of the century 9-11 carried out by Latin America."

Are you talking about the explosion aboard the Maine in 1898?
Title: On Neocon-ism as a system of foreign policy
Post by: Perd Hapley on August 29, 2005, 06:48:50 AM
Uh, no.  I was implying that I was unaware of anything in that context comparable to 9-11, just to point out why I though Butler's comment doesn't "fit" like Blackburn says.
Title: On Neocon-ism as a system of foreign policy
Post by: Guest on August 29, 2005, 11:42:23 AM
Quote from: fistful
I know I shouldn't give him the satisfaction, but...


Quote
Two choices in personal self-defense:

1) When someone attacks you, you defend yourself.

2) Punch everyone you meet.
Two choices in personal or national defense:

1) When someone earnestly threatens to attack you, you defend yourself by the use of force.

2) You shoot only if he shoots you first.
Iraq earnestly threatened north america when?
Title: On Neocon-ism as a system of foreign policy
Post by: Perd Hapley on August 29, 2005, 08:20:56 PM
Earnest:  meaning sincere

Thou asks not in earnest, yet shall I oblige thee.  

It appears Saddam, or his underlings, were making overtures to cooperate with al Qaeda.  How much cooperation took place is debatable.  Even the 9-11 commission acknowledged some linkage between the two.  Saddam was an obvious enemy to reduce.  He hates America and had already showed a willingness to use chemical weapons.  He attempted to assassinate an American president.  With or without al Qaeda, he may have attempted a terrorist attack.  He made himself our enemy in a time of war.  

You may not agree that an invasion of Iraq was the proper next step, or that it was well-executed, but you can't say the United States acted like a man punching everyone he sees.  The invasion/occupation (and the word does not embarrass me) distracted al Qaeda from high-profile terrorism in the West, and gives us a base in the Middle East from which to extend our attentions to other nations.  In doing so, and in providing a show of American might and resolve, it is intended to put the fear of Uncle Sam in our enemies.  Unfortunately, we also have to fight people like you, and the media, and the European nations we had thought to be our allies.

Thanks.
Title: On Neocon-ism as a system of foreign policy
Post by: Justin on August 29, 2005, 08:24:40 PM
Didn't really read the thread.  However, the current trend known as Neo-conservatism strikes me as nothing more than the latest outgrowth of Kissinger-style Realpolitik.
Title: On Neocon-ism as a system of foreign policy
Post by: Dannyboy on August 30, 2005, 03:36:08 AM
Here's a pretty good article on the Iraqi 9/11 connection.
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/005/996ssjsb.asp

See No Evil, Hear No Evil
From the September 5 / September 12, 2005 issue: What the 9/11 Commission narrative left out: Iraqis.
by Stephen F. Hayes
09/05/2005, Volume 010, Issue 47
      

AHMED HIKMAT SHAKIR IS A shadowy figure who provided logistical assistance to one, maybe two, of the 9/11 hijackers. Years before, he had received a phone call from the Jersey City, New Jersey, safehouse of the plotters who would soon, in February 1993, park a truck bomb in the basement of the World Trade Center. The safehouse was the apartment of Musab Yasin, brother of Abdul Rahman Yasin, who scorched his own leg while mixing the chemicals for the 1993 bomb.

When Shakir was arrested shortly after the 9/11 attacks, his "pocket litter," in the parlance of the investigators, included contact information for Musab Yasin and another 1993 plotter, a Kuwaiti native named Ibrahim Suleiman.

These facts alone, linking the 1993 and 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center, would seem to cry out for additional scrutiny, no?

The Yasin brothers and Shakir have more in common. They are all Iraqis. And two of them--Abdul Rahman Yasin and Shakir--went free, despite their participation in attacks on the World Trade Center, at least partly because of efforts made on their behalf by the regime of Saddam Hussein. Both men returned to Iraq--Yasin fled there in 1993 with the active assistance of the Iraqi government. For ten years in Iraq, Abdul Rahman Yasin was provided safe haven and financing by the regime, support that ended only with the coalition intervention in March 2003.

Readers of The Weekly Standard may be familiar with the stories of Abdul Rahman Yasin, Musab Yasin, and Ahmed Hikmat Shakir. Readers of the

9/11 Commission's final report are not. Those three individuals are nowhere mentioned in the 428 pages that comprise the body of the 9/11 Commission report. Their names do not appear among the 172 listed in Appendix B of the report, a table of individuals who are mentioned in the text. Two brief footnotes mention Shakir.

Why? Why would the 9/11 Commission fail to mention Abdul Rahman Yasin, who admitted his role in the first World Trade Center attack, which killed 6 people, injured more than 1,, and blew a hole seven stories deep in the North Tower? It's an odd omission, especially since the commission named no fewer than five of his accomplices.

Why would the 9/11 Commission neglect Ahmed Hikmat Shakir, a man who was photographed assisting a 9/11 hijacker and attended perhaps the most important 9/11 planning meeting?

And why would the 9/11 Commission fail to mention the overlap between the two successful plots to attack the World Trade Center?

The answer is simple: The Iraqi link didn't fit the commission's narrative.

AS THE TWO SIDES in the current flap over Able Danger, a Pentagon intelligence unit tracking al Qaeda before 9/11, exchange claims and counterclaims in the news media, the work of the 9/11 Commission is receiving long overdue scrutiny. It may be the case, as three individuals associated with the Pentagon unit claim, that Able Danger had identified Mohammed Atta in January or February 2000 and that the 9/11 Commission simply ignored this information because it clashed with the commission's predetermined storyline. We should soon know more. Whatever the outcome of that debate, the 9/11 Commission's deliberate exclusion of the Iraqis from its analysis is indefensible.

The investigation into the 9/11 attacks began with an article of faith among those who had conducted U.S. counterterrorism efforts throughout the 1990s: Saddam Hussein's Iraq was not--could not have been--involved in any way. On September 12, 2001, the day after the attacks, George W. Bush asked Richard Clarke to investigate the attacks and possible Iraqi involvement in them. Clarke, as he relates in his bestselling book, was offended even to be asked. He knew better.

Philip Zelikow, executive director of the 9/11 Commission, started from the same assumption. So did Douglas MacEachin, a former deputy director of the CIA for intelligence who led the commission's study of al Qaeda and was responsible for the commission's conclusion that there was "no collaborative operational relationship" between Iraq and al Qaeda. (Over the course of the commission's life, MacEachin refused several interviews with The Weekly Standard because, we were told, he disagreed with our understanding of the relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda.)

From the evidence now available, it seems clear that Saddam Hussein did not direct the 9/11 attacks. Few people have ever claimed he did. But some four years after the attacks of September 11, 2001, and one year after the 9/11 Commission released its final report, there is much we do not know. The determination of these officials to write out of the history any Iraqi involvement in terrorism against America has contributed mightily to public misperceptions about the former Iraqi regime and the war on terror.

HERE IS WHAT WE KNOW TODAY about

Ahmed Hikmat Shakir. In August 1999, Shakir, a 37-year-old Iraqi, accepted a position as a "facilitator" at the airport in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. A "facilitator" works for an airline and assists VIP travelers with paperwork required for entry and other logistical issues. Shakir got the job because someone in the Iraqi embassy in Malaysia wanted him to have it. He started that fall.

Although Shakir officially worked for Malaysian Airlines, his contact in the Iraqi embassy controlled his schedule. On January 5, 2, Shakir apparently received an assignment from his embassy contact. He was to escort a recent arrival through immigration at the airport. Khalid al Mihdhar, a well-connected al Qaeda member who would later help hijack American Airlines Flight 77, had come to Malaysia for an important al Qaeda meeting that would last at least three days. (Shakir may have also assisted Nawaf al Hazmi, another hijacker, thought to have arrived on January 4, 2000.)

Malaysian intelligence photographed Shakir greeting al Mihdhar at the airport and walking him to a waiting car. But rather than see the new arrival off, he hopped in the car with al Mihdhar and accompanied him to the meeting. Malaysian intelligence has provided its photographs to the CIA. While U.S. officials can place Shakir at the meeting with the hijackers and several high-ranking al Qaeda operatives, they do not know whether Shakir participated actively. (Also present at the meeting were Hambali, al Qaeda's top man in South Asia, and Khallad, later identified as the mastermind of the attack on the USS Cole.)

The meeting concluded on January 8, 2000. Shakir reported to work at the airport on January 9 and January 10, and then never again. Khalid al Mihdhar and Nawaz al Hazmi also disappeared briefly, then flew from Bangkok, Thailand, to Los Angeles on January 15, 2000.

Shakir, the Iraqi-born facilitator, would be arrested six days after the September 11 attacks by authorities in Doha, Qatar. According to an October 7, 2002, article by Newsweek's Michael Isikoff and Daniel Klaidman, "A search of Shakir's apartment in Doha, the country's capital, yielded a treasure trove, including telephone records linking him to suspects in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and Project Bojinka, a 1994 Manila plot to blow up civilian airliners over the Pacific Ocean." (Isikoff, it should be noted, has been a prominent skeptic of an Iraq-al Qaeda connection.)

Shakir had contact information for a lot of bad people. As noted, one was a Kuwaiti, Ibrahim Suleiman, whose fingerprints were found on the bombmaking manuals U.S. authorities allege were used in preparation for the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Suleiman was convicted of perjury and deported to Jordan. Another was Musab Yasin, the brother of 1993 Trade Center bomber Abdul Rahman Yasin. Yet another was Zahid Sheikh Mohammed, brother of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the mastermind of the September 11 attacks, now in U.S. custody. Shakir also had an old number for Taba Investments, an al Qaeda front group. It was the number long used by Mahmdouh Mahmud Salim, the highest-ranking Iraqi member of al Qaeda. According to testimony from al Qaeda informants, Salim maintained a good relationship with Saddam's intelligence service.

Despite all of this, the Qatari authorities released Shakir shortly after they arrested him.

On October 21, 2001, Shakir flew to Amman, Jordan, where he hoped to board a plane to Baghdad. But authorities in Jordan arrested him for questioning. Shakir was held in a Jordanian prison for three months without being charged, prompting Amnesty International to write the Jordanian government seeking an explanation. The CIA questioned Shakir and concluded that he had received training in counter-interrogation techniques. Shortly after Shakir was detained, Saddam's government began to pressure Jordanian intelligence--with a mixture of diplomatic overtures and threats--to release Shakir. They got their wish on January 28, 2002. He is believed to have returned promptly to Baghdad.

I have discussed Shakir with nine U.S. government officials--policymakers and intelligence officials alike. The timeline above represents the consensus view.

Two weeks before the 9/11 Commission's final report was released to the public, the Senate Select Intelligence Committee released its own evaluation of the intelligence on Iraq. The Senate report added to the Shakir story.

    The first connection to the [9/11] attack involved Ahmed Hikmat Shakir, an Iraqi national, who facilitated the travel of one of the September 11 hijackers to Malaysia in January 2000. [Redacted.] A foreign government service reported that Shakir worked for four months as an airport facilitator in Kuala Lumpur at the end of 1999 and beginning of 2000. Shakir claimed he got this job through Ra'ad al-Mudaris, an Iraqi Embassy employee. [Redacted.] Another source claimed that al-Mudaris was a former IIS [Iraqi Intelligence Service] officer. The CIA judged in "Iraqi Support for Terrorism," however, that al-Mudaris' [redacted] that the circumstances surrounding the hiring of Shakir for this position did not suggest it was done on behalf of the IIS.

A note about that last sentence: The Senate committee report is a devastating indictment of the CIA's woefully inadequate collection of intelligence on Iraq, and its equally flawed analysis. It is of course possible that the CIA's judgment about al Mudaris is correct, but the bulk of the report inspires no confidence that it is.

Consider the three new facts in this brief summary. One, Shakir himself told interrogators that an Iraqi embassy employee got him the job that allowed him to help the hijacker(s). Two, that Iraqi embassy employee was Ra'ad al Mudaris. Three, another source identified al Mudaris as former Iraqi Intelligence.

All of this information was known to the U.S. intelligence community months before the 9/11 Commission completed its investigation. And yet none of it appeared in the final report.

Two footnotes are the sum total of what the 9/11 Commission had to say about Ahmed Hikmat Shakir. Here is the more substantive, footnote 49 to Chapter 6, on page 502 of the 567-page report: "Mihdhar was met at the Kuala Lumpur airport by Ahmed Hikmat Shakir, an Iraqi national. Reports that he was a lieutenant colonel in the Iraqi Fedayeen turned out to be incorrect. They were based on a confusion of Shakir's identity with that of an Iraqi Fedayeen colonel with a similar name, who was later (in September 2001) in Iraq at the same time Shakir was in police custody in Qatar." The report is sourced to a briefing from the CIA's counterterrorism center and a story in the Washington Post. And that's it.

Readers of the 9/11 Commission report who bothered to study the footnotes might wonder who Shakir was, what he was doing with a 9/11 hijacker in Malaysia, and why he was ever "in police custody in Qatar." They might also wonder why the report, while not addressing those questions, went out of its way to provide information about who he was not. Such readers are still wondering.

There is no doubt the 9/11 Commission had this information at its disposal. On the very day it released its final report, commissioner John Lehman told me that Shakir's many connections to al Qaeda and Saddam's regime suggested something more than random chance.

So how is it that the Senate Select Intelligence Committee report contains a substantive account of Shakir's mysterious contribution to the 9/11 plot, while the 9/11 Commission report--again, released two weeks later--simply ignores it?

We now know even more about Shakir's Iraqi embassy contact, Ra'ad al Mudaris. The post-Saddam Iraqi government launched its own, secret investigation of al Mudaris and his activities. Al Mudaris was a "local employee" of the Iraqi embassy in Kuala Lumpur. That is, he was an Iraqi already living in Malaysia when he began working officially for the embassy. Although Shakir named him as his Iraqi embassy contact and another source noted his affiliation with the Iraqi Intelligence Service, the U.S. government never arrested al Mudaris. He continued his nominal employment at the Iraqi embassy in Kuala Lumpur even after the Iraq war, outliving the regime that had employed him. He left that position early last fall, shortly after he was named publicly in the Senate Select Intelligence Committee report. A senior Iraqi government official tells The Weekly Standard that al Mudaris still lives in Malaysia, a free man.

BY THE END OF LAST WEEK, the demands for more information on Able Danger had reached fever pitch. The Pentagon claimed to have launched an aggressive investigation into the project. 9/11 Commission co-chairman Thomas Kean was demanding more information on Able Danger from the National Security Council. And Senator Arlen Specter, a Pennsylvania Republican who is chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, fired off a hard-hitting letter to FBI director Robert Mueller demanding answers to a series of questions about the Pentagon unit and its interactions with the FBI.

Answers about Able Danger would be nice, but it is surely long past time for answers on Ahmed Hikmat Shakir, Abdul Rahman Yasin, and Musab Yasin. The 9/11 Commission itself and other relevant bodies should reexamine Shakir's role in the 9/11 plot and his connections to the 1993 World Trade Center plotters. The Bush administration should move quickly to declassify all of the intelligence the U.S. government possesses on Shakir and the Yasin brothers. The Senate and House intelligence committee should demand answers on the three Iraqis from the CIA, the DIA, and the FBI.

Here are some of the questions they might ask:

* Ahmed Hikmat Shakir was arrested in Doha, Qatar, just six days after the 9/11 attacks. How was he apprehended so quickly? Was the CIA monitoring his activities? What did the 9/11 Commission know about this arrest? And why wasn't it included in the 9/11 Commission's final report?

* Who identified Shakir's Iraqi embassy contact, Ra'ad al Mudaris, as former Iraqi Intelligence? Is the source credible? If not, why not?

* Have other detainees been asked about Ahmed Hikmat Shakir? If so, what have they said?

* What do the former employees of the Iraqi embassy in Malaysia tell us about Ahmed Hikmat Shakir and Ra'ad al Mudaris?

* Has anyone from the U.S. government interviewed Ra'ad al Mudaris? If so, how does he explain his activities?

* Have the names Ahmed Hikmat Shakir and Ra'ad al Mudaris surfaced in any of the documents captured in postwar Iraq from the Iraqi Intelligence headquarters in Baghdad?

* How long was the phone call between Ahmed Hikmat Shakir and the safehouse shortly before the 1993 World Trade Center attack?

* Does the U.S. government have other indications that Ahmed Hikmat Shakir and the 1993 World Trade Center bombers were in contact, either before or after that attack?

* Vice President Dick Cheney has spoken publicly about documents that indicate Abdul Rahman Yasin was provided safe haven and financing upon his return to Iraq in 1993. The FBI is blocking declassification of those documents, despite the fact that Yasin is on the FBI Most Wanted Terrorist list. Why?

* Before Operation Iraqi Freedom, Abdul Rahman Yasin, Musab Yasin, and Ahmed Hikmat Shakir were all believed to be in Iraq. Where are they today?

Stephen F. Hayes is a senior writer at The Weekly Standard.
Title: On Neocon-ism as a system of foreign policy
Post by: roo_ster on August 30, 2005, 05:30:20 AM
Quote from: Blackburn
I personally find 'Neocon' to be a sneering way for a leftist to say 'Jew' without getting in trouble. YMMV.
For a good many leftists and "paleo-cons" it most certainly is.  

Quote from: Blackburn
As for Oil, If the US was serious about it, alternative energy could change our oil-based energy infrastructure and then we could rejoice when we tell the Middle East, "We don't need your steenking oil. F-- you, and the camel you rode in on."
The only "alternative energy" that is viable is nuke & coal, with natural gas running a distant third.  All else is a pipe dream (solar, wind, etc).  Even if we converted all oil-fired power plants to nuke, I bet we'd still have to import oil.  We would have to replace some non-power-generating energy uses to nuke/coal-generated electricity to make a real dent.

Quote from: Blackburn
Also, if the Intel provided by the CIA and FBI was so faulty, why did their bosses get medals instead of their asses handed to them?
Good question.  Probably because their influence is so great in gov't & media, nowadays.  For example, the CIA recriuted their tool, Joseph Wilson, in a likely attempt to undermine GWB's policy goals.  If the decision were mine, on 12SEP2001, they would have been sacked as an example.
Title: On Neocon-ism as a system of foreign policy
Post by: Guest on August 30, 2005, 07:19:06 AM
Quote from: fistful
Earnest:  meaning sincere

Thou asks not in earnest, yet shall I oblige thee.  

It appears Saddam, or his underlings, were making overtures to cooperate with al Qaeda.  How much cooperation took place is debatable.  Even the 9-11 commission acknowledged some linkage between the two.  Saddam was an obvious enemy to reduce.  He hates America and had already showed a willingness to use chemical weapons.  He attempted to assassinate an American president.  With or without al Qaeda, he may have attempted a terrorist attack.  He made himself our enemy in a time of war.
How long are you going to cling to these lies?

Quote
You may not agree that an invasion of Iraq was the proper next step, or that it was well-executed, but you can't say the United States acted like a man punching everyone he sees.  The invasion/occupation (and the word does not embarrass me) distracted al Qaeda from high-profile terrorism in the West, and gives us a base in the Middle East from which to extend our attentions to other nations.
What for? To conquer the whole world?

Quote
In doing so, and in providing a show of American might and resolve, it is intended to put the fear of Uncle Sam in our enemies.  Unfortunately, we also have to fight people like you, and the media, and the European nations we had thought to be our allies.

Thanks.
You're welcome. You are for war; I am for peace. I guess we'll see which is the better viewpoint in the coming years.
Title: On Neocon-ism as a system of foreign policy
Post by: The Rabbi on August 30, 2005, 07:49:19 AM
Chamberlain was also for peace. Sad
Title: On Neocon-ism as a system of foreign policy
Post by: Perd Hapley on August 30, 2005, 01:52:09 PM
Futility continued:

I forgot to mention the strategic value of having troops next door to Syria and on either side of Iran.  I also forgot about Jayna Davis, who appears to have a very credible and substantive argument that McVay and Nichols were puppets of Iraq.

Quote from: fistful
It appears Saddam, or his underlings, were making overtures to cooperate with al Qaeda.  How much cooperation took place is debatable.  Even the 9-11 commission acknowledged some linkage between the two.  Saddam was an obvious enemy to reduce.  He hates America and had already showed a willingness to use chemical weapons.  He attempted to assassinate an American president.  With or without al Qaeda, he may have attempted a terrorist attack.  He made himself our enemy in a time of war.
If you could refute any of this, you would.  Instead, you just use a lame line you got from some movie.

Quote from: fistful
The invasion/occupation [of Iraq] gives us a base in the Middle East from which to extend our attentions to other nations.
Quote from: anarchist bomb-thrower
What for? To conquer the whole world?
Actually, to fight Islamism.  If you think we're trying to conquer the world, then please tell us why instead of making snide implications.


Quote
You are for war; I am for peace.
Actually, you are for defeat, destruction and horror.  Oh, I forgot anarchy.  I am for peace, which is only obtained by keeping the wicked in check.  Yes, I know; peace through war.  One of those conundrums that keep popping up in life.  Deal with it.
Title: On Neocon-ism as a system of foreign policy
Post by: The Rabbi on August 30, 2005, 04:00:40 PM
Quote from: Blackburn
I am dissapointed by the shifting goals presented by Iraq war supporters:

"Saddam has WMDs that can attack the US any day now"
"Saddam and Al-Quaida!"
"We're liberating an opressed people!"
"We're giving them democracy- er, oops, an islamic theocracy."
"A valuable forward base to fight, uh, an entire religion! Yeah!"
"Ok, so this is to defend Oil interests. How is that a bad thing?"
It may surprise you that there can be multiple goals for any major foreign policy move.  It may also be that not all of these reasons come from the same person.  It may also be there are others equally valid and not enunciated.  For example, Iraq was in violation of numerous UN resolutions and sanctions, ones that were made with an implicit threat of military action.
Title: On Neocon-ism as a system of foreign policy
Post by: Ron on August 30, 2005, 04:46:50 PM
Quote
"Saddam has WMDs that can attack the US any day now"
"Saddam and Al-Quaida!"
"We're liberating an opressed people!"
"We're giving them democracy- er, oops, an islamic theocracy."
"A valuable forward base to fight, uh, an entire religion! Yeah!"
"Ok, so this is to defend Oil interests. How is that a bad thing?"
Actually many of these reasons for war were addressed in the Iraq War Resolution.  It never was all about WMD's

http://www.yourcongress.com/ViewArticle.asp?article_id=2686
Title: On Neocon-ism as a system of foreign policy
Post by: Perd Hapley on August 30, 2005, 08:36:07 PM
Rabbi and GoRon, I must thank you.

Here comes the orator, indeed.


Quote
if we're so dependant on foreign oil that we have to engage in military action frequently to ensure the stability of the world's supply- a supply that is increasingly being gobbled up by the Chicoms...
then I guess we're gonna have to do what we have to do.  Do you want to whine about the state of things, or just face facts and act accordingly?