Sixth, and finally, we will significantly restructure the Army’s Future Combat Systems (FCS) program. We will retain and accelerate the initial increment of the program to spin out technology enhancements to all combat brigades. However, I have concluded that there are significant unanswered questions concerning the FCS vehicle design strategy. I am also concerned that, despite some adjustments, the FCS vehicles – where lower weight, higher fuel efficiency, and greater informational awareness are expected to compensate for less armor – do not adequately reflect the lessons of counterinsurgency and close quarters combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. The current vehicle program, developed nine years ago, does not include a role for our recent $25 billion investment in the MRAP vehicles being used to good effect in today’s conflicts.
Further, I am troubled by the terms of the current contract, particularly its very unattractive fee structure that gives the government little leverage to promote cost efficiency. Because the vehicle part of the FCS program is currently estimated to cost over $87 billion, I believe we must have more confidence in the program strategy, requirements, and maturity of the technologies before proceeding further.
Accordingly, I will recommend that we cancel the vehicle component of the current FCS program, re-evaluate the requirements, technology, and approach – and then re-launch the Army’s vehicle modernization program, including a competitive bidding process. An Army vehicle modernization program designed to meet the needs of the full spectrum of conflict is essential. But because of its size and importance, we must get the acquisition right, even at the cost of delay.
I was a skeptic of the lighter vehicle types chosen for FCS, but given that there are no Abrams & Bradley replacements on the horizon, the thought of quarter-century & older vehicles going on indefinitely is not a happy one. Maintaining such older hardware is very, very costly, especially considering we have to ship in every replacement part and gallon of fuel.
I was of the opinion that the heart of FCS was the networked comms, sensors, and indirect fire assets and that the particular vehicle they were strapped to was of much lesser importance.
The FCS vehicles, while not everything they were hyped up to be, were a decent medium-weight force to supplement the aging heavy forces and had the combat power to hold on until the heavies arrived by ship.
Now, we will go from an old, but adequately armored Bradley with a 25mm cannon & missiles to the Styker infantry carrier penetrable by WWI/WWII-era anti-tank
rifle armed with a mere Ma Deuce.
Oh, and those MRAP vehicles are one of the biggest wastes of politicized acquisitions & taxpayer dollars. They are just not capable enough for anything other than road-bound counter-insurgencies. If we have to actually attack and move across country, they will be left in the 'States.
There is no role for them in anything but a garrison/COIN force. There is also no role for ice cream trucks in FCS.
