Another problem is that the law (in this case the 2A) says what it says, and most principles of legal construction hold (I believe) that if you can read the plain language of the law, the gubmint can't then argue that the law says the opposite. Unfortunately, the gubmint doesn't seem to believe this with respect to the 2A.
Or the Affordable Care Act.
The language is clear: "The right of the People to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed." Grammarians and Justice Scalia's Heller opinion agree that the prefatory militia clause is nothing but window dressing, that does not in any way bind, limit or affect the operative clause of the 2A.
All of which means that the operative language of the 2A does not establish any reason or purpose for the right, it simply (supposedly) guarantees the right. Then the gubmint comes along and says, "But all Constitutional rights have always been subject to reasonable regulation."
Well, okay -- but that's in reference to the other rights in the Bill of Rights. And none of the other rights clearly state "shall not be infringed." For example, the 4A says we are to be safe from "unreasonable" searches and seizures. Obviously, if we are protected against "unreasonable" searches and seizures, the government must be allowed to conduct "reasonable" searches and seizures. What's the difference? That's why we have courts -- the determine where that line gets drawn. So the 4A right is subject to reasonable regulation -- but (IMHO) not the 2A. Regulation, no matter how the government tries to explain it or define it, IS infringement, and the 2A says they can't infringe (regulate) the 2A.
I see a lot of problems with your analysis. First, let's look at the first amendment:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
Why would "shall make no law...prohibiting the free exercise," or "shall make no law...abridging the freedom of..." allow for any more infringement or regulation than "shall not be infringed"? In both cases, though rights are, by nature, absolute, we still have to know to what those rights entitle us. Otherwise, we're left saying that a law against the broadcasting of child porn is an abridgement or infringement of the right to free speech; but it's OK, because the right to broadcast child porn has to be regulated, and it's not in the same category as the second amendment. Or instead of child porn, we could be talking about speech that incites "imminent, lawless action," or that violates intellectual property laws, etc. Whichever one we're talking about, what is the point of saying that something is a right, but it's a right upon which we can infringe? The whole essence of rights is that they are things that rightfully belong to us, that no one should be allowed to take away (which is another way of saying that rights are absolute). So it can't be a question of some rights being infringeable. It doesn't make sense to talk about a two-tiered system in which the right to bear arms is uninfringible, but the right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure, or the right to unabridged freedom of the press is subject to regulation.
It's useless for us to prattle on about, "What part of 'shall not be infringed' don't you understand?" if people don't see "common sense" regulation as an infringement. There's no getting around the fact that "the right to bear arms" is an ambiguous phrase. It certainly means that people have a right to carry guns around, but that doesn't tell us everything we need to know. It says nothing about whether I can carry my guns with my into a prison cell. It doesn't tell me whether I have a right to carry my guns with me onto someone else's privately-owned property, even when they say my guns aren't welcome. It also doesn't tell us what kind of weapons to which we have a right. (The militia clause helps with that, though I agree, it's not an operative clause.)
