The Battle for Ammunition Hill
The battle for Ammunition Hill is one of those incidents in military history that commenced, continued, and ended with a series of mistakes that only through the mettle of the average fighting man had ended up a victory rather than a disaster. Before I go into any detail about what occurred, we must first understand what Ammunition Hill was.
Jerusalem – not unlike Ancient Rome – is build on a series of tall hills – or short mountains, depending on who you ask. Control of such mountains is crucial for warfare in the city. Thus, starting 1948 with Israel's independence, Jordan began fortifying its part of Jerusalem. Among other things, the ammunition storage from the old British police academy had been turned into a fortress.
At the beginning of the Six-Day War, Israel did not expect Jordan to join in the fighting – and indeed, Jordan probably did not expect to join in. Before the war, a great effort was undertaken by Israeli intelligence to avoid Jordan's participation – but during the war, Egyptian commanders informed the Jordanians that they were making great headway against the Israelis, and that the Jordanians should join if they wanted a part of the spoils.
The Jordanians believed it and joined the wa, forcing Israel to expand it's offensive to them as well- which meant that the Center District Command, which had not expected to have to fight and that had transferred many of its troops to other commands, needed to capture East Jerusalem – and in particular, Ammunition Hill.
For this task, a paratroopers company had been chosen. The Israelis had first intended to utilize these troops in paradrop attacks beyond Egyptian lines – but the rate of advance there had been so fast, the Egyptians routed so rapidly, that this force was not needed there. The paratroopers were deployed instead to attack Ammunition Hill – a task for which they had been woefully unprepared. The officers had little knowledge of the target except for the cursory introduction to Jerusalem-area fortifications. They had been given maps and photographs of the area, but had less than a day to study them – Jordan had joined the war early morning, June 5th. The attack was to occur at midnight that same day.
This what they had to deal with – a fortified hill 797 meters toll, ringed with a system of trenches and firing positions. To add insult to injury, there was no air support whatever. And worse yet – the attack was delayed by three hours, beginning at 02:30, June 6th, with mortars and artillery raking the hilltop with fire.
The effect was less than salutary. Jordanian troops in the police academy building, alarmed by the cannonade, ran towards the bunkers
in the fort, tripling the amount of men manning it. The Israeli force had now been facing a defending unit not a third their own size – as first hoped – but nearly equal to them in numbers.
Breaching the barbed wire fence at several points, the Israeli soldiers began to enter the fort from several directions, leaping down or entering the Jordanian trenches – and discovering several new and exciting things.
The Jordanian trenches proved to be permanent structures, with their walls lined with stone. Of irregular depth – sometimes waist deep, sometimes deeper than a man stands. Worse yet – it was narrow. When I took the photos you see here, I sometimes struggled to get through the narrower spots - and I am a person a fairly regular size and was not wearing full military kit. The paratroopers were also armed with FN FAL rifles, which made getting around the trenches even more difficult.
The police academy had been abandoned during the shelling and quickly taken, and so was the trenches adjacent to the fort (they are not in existence today). The Israelis had believed – since they ecounterest almost no resisteace so far – that the rest would be easy. Most of the forces had been withdrawn, and only a single company – Company C, commanded by Oded Yaakobi -was tasked to the fight itself. He divided his company into three platoons, and prepared to attack the hill from three directions. And then everything went horribly, horribly wrong.
Ammunition Hill looks like this today. The trees weren't there in 1967.Yaakob intended to send a platoon under Lieutenant Itzhaki into the Eastern trench [not preserved to this day, sadly], a platoon under LT Eliashiv into the Western trench, and a third force, commanded personally, into the central trench.
But in the darkness, with artillery fire roaring, mortar bombs exploding around them, men lost their bearings in the narrow trenches. Elyashiv entered the central trench, Yaakobi entered the eastern trench while Itzhaki followed Eliashiv down the central trench. The Western trench remained untouched. A detachment even wondered out of the trenches...
And ended up here.That place had been known as the Triangle of Fire. It has been the killzone of several bunkers like this one:
Every man in the detachment was killed. But the officers did not hear that over the roar of Jordanian 120mm mortars and rifle fire and continued to advance through the center trench, even reporting successes on the radio – causing their superior officers to
withdraw all reserves to another mission.
Another bunker.And then everything changed. The Company commander and his men started taking incredible amounts of Jordanian fire. Every dozen meters or so was a bunker, and Jordanian soldiers who had abandoned the police academy were standing on top of the trenches, firing down at the advancing Israeli troops and throwing grenades. One of the lieutenants had been killed assaulting a recoilless rifle position, and the company commander's own platoon was reduced to only 8 troops. Company reserves were drawn in -and through heavy losses, IDF men captured the Jordanian command bunker.
One of the Jordanian barracks buildings. Roof is a new thing..
By this time – as a consequence of starting the attack late – the sun had risen, and the IDF men could be clearly seen by the Jordanians.
Casualties were too heavy. First tanks were brought in – but their turrets could not depress deep enough to strike the bunkers. More infantry were brought in, and they eventually cleared the bunkers, using machinegun fire to suppress any un-entrenched troops from acting and throwing hand-grenades into the bunkers. One was especially tough – effectively, a double-bunker, a concrete box inside a concrete box. It was resolved by bringing in a 16-kilo charge and placing it on top. By the end of the day, once the IDF figured out what was going on, they resolved the situation quickly – with only 31 dead to 72 dead Jordanians.
So why is this interesting? Take a look at these pictures.
A recoilless rifle, on the background of the Jerusalem mountains.
One of the few surviving Eastern Trench bunkers.
A view of the trench system.
What seems like a machinegun position. The polished slab of rock would serve like a desk for the machinegunner to place his gun and spare barrels.
And finally, the coup de grace – a firing slit overlooking the Triangle of Fire.
Look at my picture from the beginning,
this one You can see the Triangle of Fire in the foreground, but can you see the firing positions that would be shooting at it? I found four when I was walking in the trenches. Do you think you could spot them from that spot, in the dark, at two past midnight, when fired at, with mortar shells dropping everywhere? Most likely not. And there were literally dozens upon dozens of these bunkers, concentrated on a small hilltop – literally a firing point every dozen meters or so in some parts of it.
Now, I think there are many lessons to be learned from this, but I will leave them to my readers to hash out.
