Wooderson, did you even read the article
How about any of the writings of Hitler and his minions ??
Far from being victims of Nazism, Aly argues, the majority of Germans were indirect war profiteers. Requisitioned Jewish property, resources stolen from the conquered, and punitive taxes levied on local businesses insulated citizens from shortages and allowed the regime to create a racist-totalitarian welfare state. The German home front, Aly claims, suffered less privation than its English and American counterparts. To understand Hitlers popularity, Aly proposes, it is necessary to focus on the socialist aspect of National Socialism.
While underemphasized by modern historians, this socialism was stressed in many contemporaneous accounts of fascism, especially by libertarian thinkers. F.A. Hayek famously dedicated The Road to Serfdom to the socialists of all partiesthat is, Labourites, Bolsheviks, and National Socialists. It was the union of the anti-capitalist forces of the right and the left, the fusion of radical and conservative socialism, Hayek wrote, which drove out from Germany everything that was liberal. Ludwig von Mises agreed, arguing in 1944 that both Russia and Germany are right in calling their systems socialist.
The Nazis themselves regarded the left-right convergence as integral to understanding fascism. Adolf Eichmann viewed National Socialism and communism as quasi-siblings, explaining in his memoirs that he inclined towards the left and emphasized socialist aspects every bit as much as nationalist ones. As late as 1944, Propaganda Minister Josef Goebbels publicly celebrated our socialism, reminding his war-weary subjects that Germany alone [has] the best social welfare measures. Contrast this, he advised, with the Jews, who were the very incarnation of capitalism.
Using a farrago of previously unpublished statistics, Aly describes in detail a social system larded with benefits open only to Aryan comrades, naturally. To achieve a truly socialist division of personal assets, he writes, Hitler implemented a variety of interventionist economic policies, including price and rent controls, exorbitant corporate taxes, frequent polemics against landlords, subsidies to German farmers as protection against the vagaries of weather and the world market, and harsh taxes on capital gains, which Hitler himself had denounced as effortless income.
Aly demonstrates convincingly that Nazi domestic policies were remarkably friendly toward the German lower classes, soaking the wealthy and redistributing the burdens of wartime. And with fresh memories of Weimer inflation, transferring the tax burden to corporations earned the leadership in Berlin considerable political capital, as the government keenly registered.
For instance, at the outset of war Nazi economists established a wartime tax of 50 percent on all wages that applied only to the wealthiest Germans. In the end, Aly writes, only 4 percent of the population paid the full 50 percent surcharge. In occupied Holland, administrators dramatically raised taxes to fund an anti-Bolshevik campaign, while some Dutch companies paid upward of 112 percent of profits in tax.