Also set up to fail. The 800th was not trained or structured to run EPW or confinement facilities. That was the mission and organization of the 300th MP (PW) Command. I know, I was in the 300th.
It was also stretched far beyond the resources it had to run all the facilities in Iraq. Plus this was during the "Arrest, confine, question and hold every military age male in Iraq" phase of the war. There's a big difference between processing EPW's (a transient population) as opposed to running a confinement facility (a more stable population).
Having said that, she still was incompetent (as was much of her staff) and should have been fired long before that, simply for failing to fire the Battalion commander that ran Abu Ghraib among other things.
Anywho. Back to the book.
While he goes on and on about who should have been relieved (Maxwell Taylor, (twice); Westmoreland; Franks, Fredrick; Franks, Tommy (twice); Sanchez, Casey. While he quotes survey after survey of junior officers, fails to note that each and every one pointed out that they don't trust their commanders and know that they are required to lie to be promoted.
He does point out the the unit rotation policy of OEF/IF are a huge improvement over the individual rotation of Vietnam, yeah fails to grasp that the individual rotation policy CONUS causes the same problems as it did in Vietnam. Every commander feels that their command time is a relay race. And as long as they don't drop the baton on their leg, it's all good, and they will get a successful command OER. Whether they actually improve the unit or not.
Which causes extreme micromanagement. If your OER (and career) are hanging by a thread then every time PVT Snuffy steps on his dick it costs you points. (I saw this in Germany, a brigade commander had all his companies on a 3x5 card with tic marks next to them. "Oh, *expletive deleted*it" tic marks. And he treated different commanders and companies differently based on the number of "Oh, *expletive deleted*it' tic marks they had.) So to be successful meant not screwing up, how best to not screw up? Don't take any chances. Pencil whip reports and training. Sitting in a classroom talking about how to react to an ambush, just as good as going out and training on it, but less chance of someone having an accident in a vehicle and/or getting hurt.
No imagination, no insight, just tactics. We have the greatest tactical Army in the world, but we were/are getting beat by a bunch of illiterate tribesmen unchanged from the 6th century. Why? Because most of our military leadership doesn't know how to think, how to adapt, how to change to the battlefield. We have and are making the same mistakes as in Vietnam. The prize, the mission, the win is the people. Not killing terrorist, but the old hearts and minds thing. But all the leadership knows is DePuy's Tactics and Firepower model. Which is great, if you are fighting on the plains of Central Europe. Be we didn't even fight that war in DS/DS (The blame for the incomplete victory is on both Schwarzkopf and Franks, Fredrick. Bad plan by Schwartzkopf to have the Marines, et al attack before VII Corps had completed the encirclement, and bad on Franks to pause for 24 hours allowing a goodly sized chunk of the Republican Guard to escape.) But we're not. It's counter-insurgency. I bet not one General currently serving has read anything about the British experience in Malaysia. Nor any lessons learned from Vietnam. Seeing as the is no official Army History on Vietnam, only various books and papers.
But still. The General Officer corps has and continues to fail the nation and the soldiers entrusted to it. We have an Army of Lions, lead by Donkeys.