Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton
Martin van Creveldhttp://www.amazon.com/Supplying-War-Logistics-Wallenstein-Patton/dp/B001U6QHSW/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1444160521&sr=8-2&keywords=supplying+warAfter getting a decent grasp on the history, conduct, and strategy of war; this is a terrific treatise on war logistics.
Up until the middle of the 20th century, large armies were supplied by roaming through the countryside, taking what they needed. Some paid for what they took, others not so much. Keeping a standing army around on your own territory was a Bad Thing indeed. They would not be standing for long, as all the men & horses died from starvation and disease. Similarly, sieges were contraindicated. Upwards of 90-95pct of the mass of supplies consumed were to feed the men & horses. And most times most of THAT was fodder for horses. The need to take supplies with was relatively minimal, just irreplaceable hardware and weaponry. About 5% of the total log load.
Supplying War also bursts some war myths. The biggest being that the mastery of the use of railways was key to German victory in the Franco-Prussian War in 1870. MVC stomps a mudhole in the ass of that myth with a withering fusillade of data that demonstrates Moltke was more than a little self-serving in his post-1870 writings on that war. And everyone following him wanted to believe Moltke rather than the numbers. The Austro-Prussian (1866), Franco-Prussian (1870), and opening western front campaign by Germany in 1914 all played out the same way:
0. Germany (& its opponents) have a grand plan for rail and wagon logistics.
1. Germany (& its opponents) use the railways to mobilize at their borders.
2. The border is crossed by the maneuver units.
3. The wagon teams struggle and fail to maintain communications between maneuver units and rail heads.
4. Railways promptly grid lock as those loading the trains with supplies flood the system with rolling stock.
5. Maneuver units get the bulk of their supplies along the way by requisitioning them form the locals.
6. Road/wagon log units wander about, many times never finding their objective until the fighting is over.
7. Rail networks remain gridlocked until the fighting ends or (in WWI) remains static for a long period of time.
8. The end.
Thing is, none of those armies went hungry for long as long as they kept moving. There were severe problems when they stopped, especially to besiege some place. Matter of fact, in the fall of 1870, the German armies surrounding Paris pretty much hung up their guns and went into the fields to gather the French grain harvest.
As WWI went on, it became an exercise in logistics for both Axis & Allies on the western front. Both sides got better at it, but the last leg from supply dump to arty & front positions was still horse or man-packed. Tonnage unthinkable in wars previous were moved and chewed up. One reason there was so little movement of the trench lines was that when gains were made, they could not be re-supplied.
WWII was somewhat similar in that German logistics were largely improvisational. The Germans invaded Poland and France largely with vehicles meant for training. "Tanks" with 7.62 or 12.7 or (woo-hoo!) 20mm guns. The small in number mechanized / armored units would roll out and make things happen, leaving horse-drawn infantry and log way behind. Then they would run out of fuel and have to wait again. Luckily, the Germans captured many enemy supply dumps and could keep moving. As before, most the food was obtained locally by requisitioning, as was much of the fuel. Some few trucks were available and were requisitioned as they captured territory, but they were of limited use as there were so many types maintenance was impossible and most broke down. Luckily for the Germans, France fell quickly and the pause enabled the German armies to resupply and redeploy. Like Sherman, while htey were moving, they used relatively little ammo and could keep moving as long as they had enough to eat and what they needed to keep the trucks/wagons going.
As in WWI, the sheer mass of supply chewed up was again monumental.
When Hitler decided to invade Russia, he had about a year to build up the log system. Sadly for Adolf, it was not up to the lack of development of the lands between Poland and Moscow. The heavy trucks were useless once the mud came, as most roads were dirt. And the rail gauges were different, necessitating log transfers from one rail system to the other and/or rebuilding the rails from west to east. The German advances, as fast as they were, were still stuttering, start/stop affairs where the vehicles would periodically run dry. And it was difficult to locally requisition supplies due to the few muddy roads preventing trucks and wagons from roaming too far. Yes, there was some razed earth effect, but the big problem for resupply was not Russian action, but German log inability to deal with the utter non-development of the transport system in Russia. Also, the myth that Hitler army did not plan for winter is just that: a myth. They planned to get all sorts of winter gear (clothes, POL, etc) to the German troops, but it was horrifically difficult to get it to them.
The whole picture of German Army logistics is one of improvisation from the Austro-Prussian War through much of WWII. Most all the major German victories were done in swift campaigns that minimized the impact of logistics. The extent of German conquest in this time frame leaves you scratching your head at the audacity of it all.
On the other side, American/Allied log was one of over-analysis, over-planning, and pessimism. Most the analysis and planning before D-Day was for naught, after those plans were given a surprise buggering by reality. Really, it makes no sense to plan down to the last jerry can of fuel if the unknowns/uncertainties are on the scale of whole Army Corps. And most all the American victories were done in the face of log staff officers's objections who thought impossible to supply every operation in the time scale preferred by the operational commanders.
Supplying War is one of the more enlightening books on warfare I have read in some time. The practical lessons learned about how far a wagon or truck could re-supply from base and how the practical rate of advance for infantry, horse, or mechanized troops does not scale with the max/sustained velocities these can maintain. [Roughly *1.0, *0.5, *0.1.]. Again and again, commanders will bump up against these constraints. Also, that ratios of "tooth to tail" are pretty meaningless...as long as that tail is truly supporting the teeth and making the teeth more effective or able to act in the first place..
Good read.
